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IPO Timing, Buyout Sponsors’ Exit Strategies and Firm Performance of RLBOs 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of buyout sponsors’ IPO timing on the LBO restructuring 
process and subsequent exit strategies. I find that LBO duration is negatively related to 
hot IPO market conditions. Further, following IPOs, RLBOs with shorter LBO duration 
experience greater deterioration of performance and higher probability of bankruptcy. 
This suggests that sponsor’s efforts to enhance operating efficiency succumb to market 
timing. IPO timing does not affect sponsor’s exit strategies and monitoring post IPO. 
Sponsors keep an active long-run presence with more reputable sponsors more likely to 
exit by facilitating takeovers. 
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I. Introduction 
The initial public offering (IPO) market has witnessed an increasing number of reverse 
leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) in recent years. For instance, in 2005 approximately 53% of IPOs in 
the U.S. were backed by private equity investors. Yet, despite the increased importance of 
private equity in practice, relatively little systematic study has been done on the process through 
which buyout sponsors exit their LBO investments. Moreover, despite the widespread view that 
private equity sponsors create value in restructuring LBOs, little research explores whether 
sponsors’ exit strategies affect their restructuring efforts and in turn the extent of value creation.2  
Some critics argue that, in fact, buyout sponsors create no value in the LBO restructuring 
process. They claim that rather than use the restructuring to achieve value-enhancing operating 
improvements, buyout sponsors simply exploit favorable market conditions and time the market 
(by buying low and selling high). Supporting this view, a recent C-suite survey3 of chief 
executive officers, chief financial officers, and chief operating officers shows that the survey 
participants were primarily concerned about private equity and whether sponsors are “merely 
financial engineers who go in there, lever debt up, cut costs and pump the thing out (exit) some 
time later.” In this paper I seek to shed light on the extent to which these concerns are justified. 
To do so, I examine private equity sponsors’ exit strategies using a comprehensive sample of 
RLBOs from 1980 to 2006. Such analysis provides a good understanding of the drivers of RLBO 
activity across different market conditions.   
                                                 
2 For example, private equity firms can affect an exit by selling portfolio companies to strategic buyers.  
3 C-suite is a survey of executives at public Canadian companies that addresses issues such as the business outlook 
and the economy.  
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 In their survey of the IPO literature, Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that “market 
conditions are the most important factor in the decision to go public.” Pastor and Veronesi 
(2005) propose “optimal IPO timing” by suggesting that entrepreneurs tend to wait for more 
favourable market conditions before going public. Similarly, IPO timing applies to private-to-
public transactions since buyout sponsors can react to IPO market conditions deciding when to 
list LBOs publicly. IPO timing would have significant value implications particularly for 
immature LBOs. If IPO timing leads buyout sponsors to pull capital out of LBOs prior to 
realizing operating efficiencies, doing so is likely to negatively impact restructuring efforts, 
resulting in poor operating performance or even financial distress post-IPO. Cao and Lerner 
(2009) provide (weak) evidence that, indeed, those LBOs that are hastily listed, or flipped, 
underperform other RLBOs or the market. Their paper, however, does not examine the 
relationship between buyout sponsors’ restructuring process and IPO market conditions.   
 In this paper, I conduct two main analyses. In the first analysis, I examine two hypotheses 
regarding IPO timing of buyout sponsor in listing LBOs and timing impact on restructuring 
process and firm performance. The performance timing hypothesis posits that sponsors behave 
opportunistically by listing LBOs at the peak of pre-IPO cash flow or operating performance; 
and the market timing hypothesis posits that buyout sponsors tend to shorten the LBO 
restructuring process under more favorable external conditions for new issuance. In the second 
analysis, I examine whether IPO timing affects buyout sponsor’s monitoring and exit strategies 
in post-IPO years.  
 Under the performance timing hypothesis, buyout sponsors take advantage of some 
temporary improvement in operating performance that leads to high equity valuations. In 
general, the IPO literature (e.g., Jain and Kini (1994)) finds that new IPOs experience declines in 
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operating performance post-issuance. Studies by Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996) document similar patterns of performance deterioration for 
RLBOs. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) suggest that performance timing may explain such 
declines, with insiders listing LBOs when they see a temporary improvement in operating 
performance. Chou, Gombola, and Liu (2006), who document increases in discretionary accruals 
prior to the listings, alternatively suggest that earnings management may explain such declines. 
These early findings on RLBOs, however, often depend on a small sample of RLBOs from the 
1980s to the early 1990s, and they ignore IPO market conditions in their analysis. The recent 
development4 of the private equity industry calls for more thorough examination of RLBOs’ 
operating performance. I empirically test the above hypothesis by examining whether the 
operating performance of RLBOs deteriorates after going public. 
  Under the market timing hypothesis, in contrast, buyout sponsors bring LBOs to the 
public to take advantage of a favorable IPO market. During hot IPO issuance periods, buyout 
sponsors can earn greater proceeds by selling more LBO equity even when the restructuring 
process has not been completed (i.e., operating efficiencies have not been fully realized). Hence, 
external market conditions can generate perverse incentives for sponsors to seek quick cash 
returns from selling immature LBOs, or to even pursue so-called “quick flips,” whereby sponsors 
avail themselves of rare but profitable opportunities to exit soon after acquiring the LBO. When 
LBOs succumb to such practices, sponsors are likely to spend less time on the restructuring 
process. LBO duration, a proxy for LBO restructuring efforts, is therefore expected to be 
                                                 
4 The buyout industry today is far larger than it was during the years when it enjoyed its greatest returns. For 
instance, fundraising by U.S. buyout funds was six times greater in 1998 than in 1987, and by 2005 it was nine times 
the 1987 level. 
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negatively related to favorable IPO market conditions and market returns. As a result, IPO timing 
is expected to result in a decline in RLBO performance. To test these predictions, I relate 
declines of RLBO performance post IPO to market conditions in multivariate analysis.  
The empirical evidence from the above analysis rejects the performance timing 
hypothesis but supports the market timing hypothesis. Specifically, RLBOs show no declines in 
operating performance. The results provide empirical support for Pastor, Taylor and Veronesi 
(2009) who suggest that due to IPO timing, firm profitability declines after the IPO and that this 
decline is larger for firms with more volatile profitability and firms with less uncertain average 
profitability. The evidence suggests that RLBOs, firms with low profitability volatility and 
uncertainty, show no declines in profitability. I find that buyout sponsors appear to shorten LBO 
duration when market conditions are more favorable for new IPOs. Shortening duration leads to 
worse long-run performance and a greater probability of bankruptcy. Interestingly, the findings 
also provide support for Schultz’s pseudo market timing, according to which buyout sponsors do 
not take advantage of mispricing by selling overpriced equity, but rather use favorable external 
IPO market conditions to expedite their exit of LBOs.  
Next, I examine whether buyout sponsors maintain a post-issuance presence in RLBO 
companies following their IPO. The decision to maintain a presence post-IPO is important. First, 
given buyout sponsors specialize in monitoring (Gertner and Kaplan (1996)), a continued 
presence post-IPO suggests that buyout sponsors complete more of the restructuring process (i.e., 
realize more operating efficiency gains). In addition, because the lockup provisions of new 
issuances 5 help align the interests of insiders with those of public investors (Field and Hanka 
                                                 
5 IPOs generally feature lockup agreements that prohibit corporate insiders from selling shares before a certain date, 
which may range from one month to several years after the IPO. 
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(2001), Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002)), and because RLBO lockup provisions are no 
different from those of other IPOs6, the interests of RLBO buyout sponsors are expected to be 
further in line with those of public investors. These arguments imply that IPO timing in going-
public decision is not equivalent to buyout sponsors exiting quickly or cashing out. Indeed, many 
RLBOs use their IPO proceeds to reduce or retire debt that is approaching maturity, a potential 
benefit for bond investors in RLBO firms because going public strengthens the company’s 
balance sheet.   
Note that buyout sponsors are not subject to selling restrictions once their IPO lockup 
provisions expire. They may, however, choose exit strategies (both when and how to exit) to 
time the market. Hence, to address the question of whether market conditions and reputation 
concern affect buyout sponsor’s exit post-IPO, this analysis follows Zingales (1995) and 
examines buyout sponsors’ post-issuance exit strategies across market conditions and sponsor’s 
characteristics. The findings suggest that sponsors’ exit choices can be explained by firm cash 
flows, the sponsor’s reputation, market conditions, and firm ownership structure. For example, 
buyout sponsors are more likely to maintain a post-IPO presence in RLBO companies when they 
can obtain greater cash flows from doing so or when market conditions are less favorable. 
Further, consistent with their control rights, reputable buyout sponsors are more inclined to exit 
by facilitating a post-IPO takeover when their ownership share is greater.  
This research contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, it sheds light on 
the factors that influence buyout sponsors’ restructuring processes and exit strategies. Second, 
unlike earlier studies, this paper employs a comprehensive sample of 594 RLBOs from 1981 to 
                                                 
6 The RLBO lockup provisions in the sample averaged 186 days, not significantly different from those of other IPOs 
in the same industry. This result is not reported but is available upon request.  
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2006. This expansion of the dataset is important because it captures the structural development 
of the private equity industry over the last two decades. Moreover, the large sample spans both 
hot and cold IPO waves, thereby enabling investigation of buyout sponsors’ market timing. In 
sum, this paper offers new evidence that buyout sponsors are able to take advantage of favorable 
IPO market conditions in private-to-public transactions7.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
discussion and a review of the related literature. Section 3 discusses the sample and outlines the 
paper’s empirical methods. Section 4 presents the empirical results on performance timing and 
market timing, and Section 5 presents the empirical results on buyout sponsors’ exit strategies in 
post-IPO years. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Background and Literature Review 
RLBOs differ from other IPOs or IPOs backed by venture capitalists in two respects. 
First, being sponsored by private equity investors, RLBO companies usually have a highly 
leveraged capital structure; and second, their buyout sponsors, having concentrated ownership, 
are active and often controlling owners that play an intensive monitoring role. These buyout 
sponsors typically acquire public or private companies through their LBO funds8 and 
subsequently spend time and effort restructuring the LBOs. Once the restructuring process is 
complete, they sell equity in the LBOs to the public through IPOs. In RLBOs specifically, the 
                                                 
7 Kaplan and Stromberg (2008) find that in private-to-public transactions, private equity investors may take 
advantage of market mispricing between the debt and equity markets. 
8 Because LBO funds are often contracted to last for a limited life cycle, usually 10–12 years, buyout sponsors have 
increasing liquidity demands to exit from LBO companies as funds approach maturity. 
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buyout sponsors’ final compensation is dependent on the so-called carried interest.9 This 
compensation structure gives sponsors incentives to extract maximum profits from their 
investments within a certain horizon. Since private equity investor exist to generate returns for its 
investors or limited partners, the faster they can do so, the better. Nonetheless, because buyout 
sponsors’ interests as they stand ready to cash out are not necessarily aligned with those of 
outside public shareholders, there is concern that the delivery of quick profits in LBOs sacrifices 
public shareholder interests, particularly in RLBOs with very little restructuring effort.  
Indeed, Cao and Lerner (2009)) show that his conflict of interest is especially relevant in 
quick flips, portfolio companies flipped to public investors within a very short period after their 
LBOs (defined by the authors as less than one year from LBO to IPO).10 Quick flips have thus 
been subject to recent scrutiny because public investors doubt that buyout sponsors have time to 
make enough improvements in operation or governance. To illustrate this problem, Figure 1 
shows the operating performance of RLBO firms that are quick flips versus those that are not. 
Whereas the median of quick flip EBITDA/sales increases before the IPOs and decreases in post-
IPO years, other RLBOs show no decline in EBITDA/sales. This peculiar pattern not only 
implies the propping up of performance in quick flips compared to other RLBOs but reflects the 
doubt about whether buyout sponsors add any value in quick flips and whether they face 
perverse incentives to flip certain firms quickly.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 Here] 
                                                 
9  Carried interest is the right to receive a specified share (20% to 25%) of the profits ultimately earned by an 
investment fund over some previously agreed upon benchmark return. Because general partner carries depend on the 
general cash return of a given investment, general partners have incentives to monitor and realize final cash returns.    
10 Although this analysis employs different duration measures (less than one and a half years or two years), the 
empirical findings throughout the paper remain unchanged. 
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General scrutiny of RLBOs stems from the potential moral hazard as, based on insider 
knowledge, buyout sponsors push problematic LBO firms public before hidden problems can 
unfold, thereby transfering the expected bankruptcy risk and loss to public investors. In fact, 
approximately 10% of the RLBO sample was delisted after going public, with most going 
bankrupt by filing Chapter 11 or Chapter 7. Hence, this analysis links the probability of post-IPO 
delisting to LBO duration to identify whether buyout sponsors push immature LBOs public 
because of the greater susceptibility to bankruptcy risk.  
The interplay among buyout sponsors’ incentives and corporate decisions is a critical 
issue for both researchers and investors, and the debate about buyout sponsors’ controversial 
role, especially in PE-backed IPOs, is ongoing. Such controversy is clearly illustrated by the case 
of Warner Bros. Music, bought in March 2004 for $2.6 billion by a group led by Thomas H. Lee 
Partners and Edgar Bronfman Jr. and taken public 14 months later. Along the way, the sponsors 
had Warner Bros. Music pay them dividends worth more than $1 billion. When Warner went 
public, analysts and investors said they expected the private equity firms to sell their stakes to 
lock in their gains. However, after the offering, these firms continued to control a majority stake 
worth about $2 billion. In fact, Warner Bros. Music rejected a buyout offer from EMI, another 
large music publisher, and as a defensive strategy even made a counterbid. This case raises 
several important questions: Why did the sponsors of Warner Bros. Music reject the takeover 
offer for quick cash? In what sense should buyout sponsors maintain an active role in RLBO 
companies post IPO? How can the reputation of private equity investor groups mitigate the 
conflict of interest between buyout sponsors and outside investors?11
                                                 
11 There is also a potential conflict of interest between debt holders and equity holders in LBOs and RLBOs.  
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Several additional studies are highly relevant to this analysis. First, in an early study, 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) argue that stock market listing is an exit mechanism for 
professional pre-IPO investors such as buyout sponsors. More recent work by Brau, Francis, and 
Kohers (2003) on the choice of private firms to either go public or sell to a publicly traded buyer 
finds that these companies favor the IPO route over a takeover when the firm size is large and the 
industry market-to-book ratio is low. Benninga et al. (2005), however, link the decision to go 
public to the possibility of sequential privatization (buyouts after IPOs). After linking these 
dynamic decisions to underlying cash flows, they suggest that entrepreneurs make tradeoffs 
between the benefits of keeping firms private and the value added of going public. One difficulty 
in such research is determining exactly when buyout sponsors exit from RLBOs. For instance, 
KKR spent approximately three years post LBO holding Safeway as a portfolio company but 
ultimately took more than 10 years to sell its stake in Safeway following the IPO. Therefore, like 
Giot and Schwienbacher (2007), this analysis focuses on sponsor’s post-IPO presence in or exit 
from VC-backed IPOs. 
 IPOs tend to cluster during hot periods. The literature suggests that this phenomenon can 
be explained in part by high cash flows (Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005)), industry 
effects (Ritter (1984), Jain and Kini (2006)), and high underpricing (Lowry and Schwert (2002)). 
Alti (2005) further relates IPO clustering to market timing arguing that high offer-price 
realizations have positive spillover effects that attract subsequent IPOs. Ritter (1991) finds that 
IPO performance frequently involves long-run investment underperformance. In IPOs and SEOs 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) attribute long-run poor performance to temporary market mispricing; 
that is, new issuing firms take advantage of new equity overvaluation. However, Jain and Kini’s 
(1994) study on post-issue operating performance finds that, although IPOs generally exhibit a 
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decline in operating performance, IPOs with concentrated entrepreneurial ownership demonstrate 
relatively superior performance among issuing firms. Earlier research by Degeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993) suggests that RLBO firms differ from IPOs: they are not only larger than the 
average IPO but often use IPO proceeds to reduce debt. Nonetheless, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1996) find that RLBO companies in the 1980s showed better operating performance post-IPO 
than the industry average, although their operating performance decreased as ownership 
concentration (of management and other insiders) decreased.  
 
III. Data and Empirical Methods 
A.  Sample Description 
In this analysis, two criteria define an RLBO transaction. First, an IPO must have 
previously received LBO financing sponsored by a buyout group, and second, the LBO 
investment must be characterized by immense use of leverage. Buyout firms/funds that engage 
primarily in buyout investment activities were identified from Thomson’s VentureXpert and 
Standard and Poors’ Capital IQ. The sample excludes investments by buyout organizations that 
more closely resemble venture capital. The RLBO transactions were identified using two types 
of sources. The first included the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Corporate New Issues 
database, which flags IPOs with an identifier indicating a previous leveraged buyout, and LBO 
databases that indicate whether any transaction subsequently went public. These searches 
produced a sample of 229 RLBOs for the period from 1981 through the middle of 1998. The 
second set of sources included Dealogic and Capital IQ, both of which report IPOs backed by 
financial sponsors, as well as a search of news stories on Factiva using the same criteria. These 
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sources generated an additional 297 RLBOs12 to produce a final sample of 594 RLBOs from 
1981 to 2006.13  Companies were excluded based on the following criteria: offer sizes below $5 
million, offer prices below $5.00 per share, unit trust, closed-end funds, ADRs, and IPOs not 
listed on CRSP within six months of issuing. Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are included 
because they make up a fair number of the sample. 
The IPO underwriter reputation data, measured by an amended version of Carter and 
Manaster (1990), was obtained from Jay Ritter’s website,14 and the LBO information on buyout 
sponsors from the Factiva press search. Ownership data and board information at the time of the 
IPO were collected from the IPO prospectuses, while post-IPO board information and ownership 
data were taken from proxy filing statements on the SEC’s EDGAR website. Because of data 
availability issues that reduce the sample size, the analysis of post-IPO sponsor exit strategies 
requires a three-year window for ownership data. The regressions thus report the actual 
observations used in the multivariate analysis. The accounting data for RLBOs were obtained 
from COMPUSTAT, which measures accounting variables at the end of the calendar or fiscal 
year. Return, price, and delisting information were taken from the CRSP Monthly Stock 
database.  
[INSERT Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 presents the industry distribution of RLBOs and all other IPOs, the majority of 
which, in both cases, are concentrated in the manufacturing industry. The personal business 
industry accounts for the second largest concentration and retail for the third.  
                                                 
12 There are overlaps between data from Dealogic/Capital IQ and the SDC’s VentureXpert.  
13 To ensure the quality of the final sample, the criteria and procedure follow Cao and Lerner (2007), who discuss 
the complications of identifying RLBO transactions. 
14 http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter
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[INSERT Table 2 Here] 
Table 2 lists the top 20 active RLBO sponsors and reports each sponsor’s total number of 
RLBOs, average RLBO size, and average money left on the table (defined as the multiplication 
of underpricing and offer size). Many buyout sponsors are repeat players in IPO markets, with 
KKR topping the list as sponsor of 24 RLBOs. At the bottom of the list is Lehman Brothers with 
6 RLBOs.  
[INSERT Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 summarizes the yearly distribution of RLBOs, the average LBO duration each 
year, and the subsequent delisting numbers or post-IPO takeover (being acquired) activities. 
RLBO distribution is highly correlated with the buyout cycles in a lagged fashion. For 1992, 
when many LBOs acquired in the late 80s began returning to the public market, there are a 
staggering 63 offerings. The first LBO wave also gave rise to the first RLBO wave: 14 and 22 
RLBOs for 1986 and 1987, respectively. However, after the collapse of the junk bond/LBO 
markets, RLBO activities dried up, with only 4 RLBOs in 1988 and 3 in 1989.  
For the private years between LBO and IPO, RLBO companies exhibited great 
heterogeneity: some remained private for only a short period of time (e.g., less than a year), 
while others stayed private for up to 10 years. RLBO firms on average remained private15 for 
3.75 years, with a median duration of 2.83 years. Among all RLBOs, 70 deals (11.8% of the total 
sample) were quick flips, mostly taking place in 1987 and the late 90s in hot LBO and IPO 
periods. A total of 61 firms subsequently delisted, and 199 firms (one third of the sample) were 
                                                 
15 However, Kaplan and Stromberg’s (2008) study of LBO longevity globally, including all exits including RLBOs 
and trade sales of portfolio companies, indicates a much longer holding period.  
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acquired within five years of going public. This proportion is similar to that for all listed firms 
acquired in takeovers.  
 
B. Empirical Methods 
Under the performance timing hypothesis, RLBO companies will exhibit drastic 
performance deterioration after going public. Therefore, the analysis of firm operating 
performance employs the EBITDA/sales and ROA (net income/asset) measures used in earlier 
studies to identify the general patterns of RLBO operating performance both around their IPOs 
and in post-IPO years. More specifically, based on industry and industry and performance-
matched companies16 as benchmarks, it reports the operating performance of both the whole 
sample and subsamples such as quick flips, as well as RLBO financial performance adjusted by 
the market in post-IPO years. 
The multivariate analysis regresses RLBO performance on variables of interest like LBO 
duration and the sponsor’s reputation proxy, with the cross-section regression specified as 
follows:  
(1)  Performance = α0 + α1 LBO Duration + α2 Reputation + α3 Controls + ε. 
The performance measures include change in operating performance (measured by 
EBITDA/sales two years after IPO minus EBIDTA/sales in the year of the IPO) and stock 
performance (measured by buy-and-hold three-year return adjusted by the market). The other 
independent variables include the logarithm of firm size, changes in leverage (debt to asset ratio), 
a quick flip dummy, changes in industry performance, and the IPO market condition. As 
                                                 
16 Barber and Lyon (1996) propose that an industry and performance benchmark is more robust to accounting 
measure reversals.  
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suggested by Holthausen and Larcker (1998), the change in industry operating performance is 
used to control the mean reversion in accounting measure. Consistent with Alti (2005), the IPO 
market condition is proxied by two variables — aggregate numbers of issuances or average 
underpricing of all IPOs in the previous three months, and IPO underpricing is measured as the 
first-day return (closing price at the IPO deflated by offer price). Following Cao and Lerner 
(2007), buyout sponsor reputation is measured as the capital they have historically managed and 
their vintage age. 
Under the market timing hypothesis, favorable external market conditions affect LBO 
duration because buyout sponsors are more likely to take the LBO public quickly (hence, RLBO) 
to take advantage of the hotter issuance market for new IPOs. This assumption leads to two 
empirical predictions: a negative relationship between LBO duration and IPO market activities, 
and a greater likelihood of quick flips in hotter markets. Buyout sponsor reputation may also be 
important. For example, the reputation effect may align sponsors’ interests with those of the 
public, encouraging more reputable sponsors to spend more time restructuring and improving 
LBOs before taking them public. Accordingly, the multivariate regression also assesses the 
determinants of LBO duration using the following OLS specification: 
(2) Log(LBO duration) = α0 + α1 Market Conditions + α2 Reputation+ α3 Controls + ε, 
where the dependent variable is the number of years that a firm stays private from LBO to 
RLBO. The explanatory variables include IPO market condition, industry Q, sponsor reputation, 
firm size, operating performance, leverage, and company EBITDA/sales.  
Sponsor decisions about the length of LBO restructuring, however, are not homogeneous 
across RLBOs. Therefore, any analysis of the effect of duration on performance must take into 
account this self-selection issue, especially for quick flips. To control for this problem, I 
 16
investigate the likelihood of a quick flip and its effects on subsequent firm performance using 
Heckman’s selection regressions, a two-step estimation procedure:   
(3) Step 1: Probit (Quick Flip) = α0 + α1 IPO condition + α3 · Controls + ε 
                        Step 2: Performance = α0 + α1 · Quick Flip + α2 · Controls + α3 · Lambda + ε. 
 The first step is a probit regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when 
the RLBO is classified as a quick flip (an LBO duration of less than one year17), 0 otherwise. 
The identifying instruments on the right-hand side include the industry dummy, IPO market 
condition, buyout sponsor reputation,18 the relative size of LBO firms to their buyout sponsors’ 
capital, and RLBO firm’s prior operating performance. The inclusion of relative size captures the 
economic significance of a given RLBO to GP capital under management. For example, 
sponsors may be more likely to flip a relatively smaller firm. The second-step regression 
includes lambda, the inverse Mills ratio imputed from the first-step probit regression, as an 
additional control variable for selection bias. The dependent variable in the second stage is either 
a long-run performance measure of EBITDA of sales or a delisting dummy (measured within the 
three post-IPO years). 
Because buyout sponsors are subject to lockup restrictions, however, an RLBO is not 
equivalent to a quick, complete sponsor exit. Moreover, as major active investors, sponsors may 
have to choose to continue ownership and monitoring during post-IPO periods. I therefore 
compile a descriptive summary of the ownership structure and board share of sponsors in RLBOs 
before and after IPOs. Since buyout sponsor’s full exit is not fully observable in a long horizon, 
                                                 
17 When, as a robustness check, I define quick flips using an alternative duration of two years, the results hold. 
18 In the case of VC-backed IPOs, Gompers (1995) proposes a grandstanding hypothesis in which young venture 
capitalists take very young portfolio companies public to garner publicity for the next fund raising.  
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the analysis of buyout sponsor presence post IPO uses the Cox proportional hazard duration 
approach adopted by Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) in their analysis of venture capitalist’s exits 
from VC-backed IPOs. The Cox regression for survival analysis is specified as follows: 
(4) h(t|x) = h(t)* exp(α1 · x1 + α2 · x2 +…+ αN · xN)            x = x1,  x2,  …, xN.
In this regression, the dependent variable is a survival (no full exit) dummy set to 0 if the 
sponsor’s ownership is positive in year t after the IPO and 1 if the ownership drops to zero in 
year t. Because the cut-off point is a three-year post-IPO window, the parameter t takes the 
values 0, 1, 2, and 3. The explanatory variables include EBITDA/sales, stock monthly excess 
return over the market, Tobin’s Q, and sponsor reputation. Tobin’s Q, which measures a firm’s 
growth opportunity (Kaplan and Zingales (1997)), is the ratio of the market value19 of assets 
divided by their book value.  
Buyout sponsors can choose at least two common mechanisms for a post-IPO exit:  
takeovers (RLBO acquisition by third parties) and gradual distribution of shares (to public 
investors and limited partners). The analysis of these exiting choices employs both binomial and 
multinomial probit regressions:  
(5) Exit Dummy = Φ (α + β Cash Flow + δ Ownership + Ψ Reputation + γ Controls+ ε). 
In the binomial probit regression, the exit dummy takes the value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the 
sponsor fully exits via either takeover or gradual share distribution (i.e., ownership drops to 
zero). In the multinomial probit regression, the exit dummy is set to 1 if a full exit takes the form 
of a takeover (acquisition), 2 if a gradual distribution (ownership drops to zero), and 0 otherwise. 
Here, Φ is a cumulative probability function for normal distribution. Again, the cut-off point is 
                                                 
19 The market value of assets is their book value plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book 
value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). 
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three years post IPO. The explanatory variables of interest are EBITDA/sales, Tobin’s Q, 
industry Q, ownership structure, LBO duration, and sponsor reputation. The control variables are 
firm size and leverage. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Univariate Analysis of Performance Timing 
The univariate analysis tests the performance timing hypothesis that firms experience 
performance deterioration after their IPOs. Table 4 summarizes the key financial ratios and 
operating performance (both unadjusted and adjusted) of RLBO firms from year IPO-1 to year 
IPO+2. Panel A reports the sample mean of book asset, employees, EBITDA/sales, sales growth 
rate, debt/asset, long-term debt/total debt, and other credit conditions.  
[INSERT Table 4 Here] 
As the table shows, the debt ratio (total debt/book assets) peaks at one year before the 
IPO; the RLBO firms’ assets and employees gradually increase around the IPO; and the ratio of 
convertible debt and preferred stock/long-term debt decreases substantially after the IPO, 
suggesting that a large portion of equity-linked (convertible) debt) is either converted into 
common stock or retired. The unadjusted operating performance in Panel A, however, shows no 
consistent pattern of performance deterioration: ROA (net income/assets) gradually increases and 
peaks at IPO+1, while EBITDA/sales remain fairly stable around IPOs. Like that of other firms, 
RLBO firms’ sales growth rate reaches its peak level in the first year of the IPO and gradually 
deteriorates afterwards.  
Panels B and C report benchmark-adjusted RLBO performance, with EBITDA/sales and 
ROA adjusted by the industry mean or median or by the industry and performance benchmark 
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(matched EBITDA/sales or ROA at year IPO-1), respectively. Neither measure of benchmark-
adjusted operating performance exhibits any post-IPO deterioration. On the contrary, consistent 
with Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), RLBOs show persistently superior operating 
performance in post-IPO years: EBITDA/sales or ROA outperforms the relative benchmarks by 
a range from 1% to 5%. Such performance persistence suggests that buyout sponsors on average 
maintain superior RLBO operating performance; hence, the performance timing hypothesis can 
be rejected. In the special RLBO subsample of quick flips, however, there is a strong pattern of 
performance deterioration: both EBITDA/sales and ROA jump just before the IPO but decrease 
drastically after it. Given that this evidence is robust for both mean and median, the performance 
timing hypothesis is rejected for the full RLBO sample but supported for the quick flip 
subsample.  
Panel D reports RLBO stock performance, specifically the one-year, two-year, and three-
year buy-and-hold return post IPO, both unadjusted and adjusted by market (the value-weighted 
CRSP return). The results are consistent with Cao and Lerner (2009): RLBOs in general 
outperform or at least do not underperform the market. Quick flips, however, exhibit worse 
performance than other RLBOs and do underperform the market—their median market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold return is (weakly) negative and significant.  
[INSERT Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression of change in operating 
performance (EBITDA/sales) from the year of the IPO to year IPO+2, as well as the stock 
performance (the three-year buy-and-hold return over market). The explanatory variables in the 
OLS regression include LBO duration/a quick flip dummy, an IPO market condition proxy, 
sponsor reputation, and other firm characteristics. LBO duration is positively and significantly 
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associated with performance change: firms remaining private one additional year show almost a 
1% improvement in change in EBITDA/sales after the IPO. The evidence also suggests more 
performance deterioration in firms with shorter LBO duration: the quick flip dummy is 
negatively and significantly associated with a change in operating performance after going 
public.   
Overall, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that LBO duration is a good proxy for sponsors’ 
LBO restructuring efforts. Moreover, the change in performance is negatively related to the IPO 
market condition, indicating that performance timing must be specific to market condition: 
RLBOs issued under more favorable IPO market conditions are more likely to experience greater 
deterioration in operating performance. These results are robust to other measures of 
performance such as net income/assets. 
B. Multivariate Analysis of Market Timing 
Capital market conditions affect sponsor decisions of RLBO or staying private with more 
restructuring. Hence, the market timing hypothesis suggests that sponsors will shorten LBO 
duration and be more likely to take (immature) LBOs public given the advantage of a favorable 
IPO market. The results of the OLS regression to analyze LBO duration are given in Table 6, in 
which the dependent variable of LBO duration (the logarithm of one-plus years as a private 
LBO) is regressed on the IPO market condition proxy, sponsor reputation, firm operating 
performance, firm size (sales), and other firm characteristics. 
[INSERT Table 6 Here] 
As the table shows, LBO duration is positively associated with sales, suggesting that 
larger LBOs may require more effort and hence more time for improvement. IPO market 
condition does affect LBO duration: the number of years as an LBO decreases with the aggregate 
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IPO underpricing (a proxy for IPO market condition) during the previous three months. The 
general industry valuation is also important: not only is the industry Tobin’s Q negatively 
associated with LBO duration, but both regression coefficients are significant at either the 5% or 
10% level. This evidence supports the market timing hypothesis: buyout sponsors sell portfolio 
companies more quickly to public investors when general IPO market conditions are more 
favorable or industry valuation of firm assets is higher.  
C. Market Timing and Performance of Quick Flips  
The extreme case of shortened duration is the quick flip, an option that must be 
deliberately chosen by buyout sponsors based on information about portfolio characteristics, firm 
quality, or market conditions. As outlined previously, the multivariate analysis controls for such 
selection decisions using Heckman’s two-step procedure with lambda as a control: in the first-
step probit regression on the quick flip decision, the dependent variable is set to 1 for quick flip, 
0 for other RLBOs; in the second-step regression, the dependent variable is long-run RLBO 
performance (either EBITDA/sales or the delisting dummy).  
[INSERT Table 7 Here] 
As Table 7 shows, the relative size of RLBO firms (firm asset relative to sponsor size, 
measured by total historical capital under management) is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of quick flip, suggesting that this choice is more likely for relatively smaller LBOs. 
The likelihood of quick flip is also positively associated with the aggregate number of IPOs in 
the past three months and hotter IPO issuance periods. The coefficient of EBITDA/sales is 
positive and significant, possibly because firms having stable operating performance do not have 
to stay private for long or that, consistent with the evidence in Tables 5 and 6, quick flips 
experience more operating performance deterioration because sponsors are more likely to flip 
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firms that are experiencing a performance peak (performance timing). Such quick flip markups 
in EBIDTA/sales before IPOs and subsequent performance drops are also illustrated in Figure 1.  
In the second-stage Heckman analysis, quick flip dummy is significantly and negatively 
associated with long-run operating performance (average EBITDA/sales in the three years 
following the IPO). In contrast, the dummy is significantly and positively related to the 
likelihood of a firm being delisted within five years after the IPO. The evidence also reveals that, 
once the selection bias is controlled for, the long-run performance of quick flips is significantly 
worse than that of other RLBOs. This finding further supports the role of operating performance 
timing in the quick flips that tend to occur in hotter IPO period. Moreover, sponsors’ 
opportunistic timing decisions for immature LBOs lead to value destruction; that is, quick flips 
exhibit poorer performance in the long run.  
 
V. Empirical Results for Sponsor Exit 
A. Analysis of Sponsors’ Post-IPO Presence 
[INSERT Table 8 Here] 
As shown in Table 8, which reports the ownership structure of RLBOs around IPOs and 
in post-IPO years, buyout sponsors20 on average hold approximately 60% of equity ownership 
prior to IPOs, but their ownership level decreases to 40% immediately after the IPO. This 
decrease is partly due to share dilution and partly to IPO stock sales. Moreover, as indicated by 
the summary statistics of sponsor ownership levels and percentage of board directors affiliated 
                                                 
20 Both sponsor-managed capital and sponsor vintage years show large cross-sectional variation. The largest buyout 
sponsor has about $39 billion of capital raised, whereas the smallest sponsor has less than $5 million. Vintage age, 
however, does not distinguish between nonexistent and still existent private equity firms. 
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with buyout groups post IPO (Panels B and C), buyout sponsors continue holding significant 
equity stakes in the long term. Specifically, their ownership decreases from about 32% to 24% 
from year IPO+1 to year IPO+3. Likewise, sponsors retain a significant board share: the 
percentage of buyout-affiliated directors decreases from 32% in year IPO+1 to 25% in year 
IPO+3.   
In addition, since LBO funds have a limited lifecycle, sponsors have a greater impetus to 
exit from RLBO companies that have been held for a longer time. Hence, the analysis of sponsor 
decisions on post-IPO presence employs the Cox proportional duration approach (a survival 
model) to control for this unobserved liquidity demand. The results for the Cox proportional 
hazard regressions, specified in Equation (3), are presented in Table 9.   
[INSERT Table 9 Here] 
Whereas the coefficient of EBITDA/sales is negative and significant, the coefficient of 
Tobin’s Q is significant and positive, suggesting that buyout sponsor’s post-IPO 
presence/retention of stakes, which is more likely in RLBO companies with better stock 
performance, increases cash flow but decreases equity valuation. However, general market 
conditions like industry valuation or stock market performance have a weak impact on post-IPO 
duration: the coefficient of the industry Q is positive and significant, but the coefficient of the 
market returns (S&P 500) is positive but insignificant.  
Overall, the evidence from this analysis suggests that sponsors retain their post-IPO 
presence in firms with more cash flow but are more likely to reduce duration or sell stakes when 
firms have higher stock valuation. These findings provide new empirical evidence for Zingales’ 
(1995) conclusions: incumbent buyout sponsors continue their presence post IPO to extract cash 
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flow benefits but are more likely to cash out quickly (shorten their duration of post-IPO 
presence) when firms receive higher external valuations. 
B.  Determinants of the Exiting Mechanism  
Because sponsors may find it easier to exit and cash out when they can sell RLBO 
companies to a third party through takeover, the mechanism of exit matters for post-IPO 
duration. Table 10 outlines buyout sponsor choices between exit via a facilitating takeover (being 
acquired) and exit through gradual share distribution (to limited partners or public investors in 
SEOs until ownership drops to zero) as they relate to firm fundamentals, market conditions, and 
sponsor reputation.  
[INSERT Table 10 Here] 
Columns 2 and 3 report the probit analysis results for a sponsor’s post-IPO exit via a 
facilitating takeover  based on a dummy dependent variable set to 1 if RLBO firms are acquired 
within three years after going public, 0 otherwise. Columns 4 and 5 report the probit analysis 
results for sponsor exit via gradual distribution of shares, with the dependent variable set to 1 if 
sponsor ownership drops to zero without takeover (in which case, sponsors typically distribute 
shares to investors), 0 otherwise. In both cases, the sponsor’s choice of exit decreases cash flow 
measures like EBITDA/sales, suggesting that sponsors retain a longer post-IPO presence when 
they can extract more cash flow. Thus, the probability of exit via takeover/share distribution 
increases/decreases with sponsor ownership. The evidence also suggests that sponsors extract 
more control benefit by exiting via facilitating takeover and are more reluctant to distribute all 
shares when ownership is highly concentrated. 
Columns 6 and 7, which present the multinomial probit analysis of the two exit 
alternatives, show that the probability of a sponsor’s exit via distributions increases with Tobin’s 
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Q, although Q is unrelated to the probability of exit via takeovers. The evidence also suggests 
that, among various exit choices, sponsors are more likely to choose exit via share distribution 
when companies have higher valuations. In addition, the coefficient of buyout sponsor reputation 
is significant for sponsor exit via facilitating takeover, suggesting that more reputable sponsors 
are more likely to choose exit via takeover than exit via share distribution. Sponsors are also 
more likely to choose exit via takeover when RLBOs are larger and their duration is longer. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 10 is consistent with a rational exit choice by buyout sponsors 
seeking to maximize both cash flow and control benefits.  
C. Operating Performance around Sponsor’s Full Exit 
 Because of the sponsor monitoring role, if the presence of buyout sponsors helps to 
improve RLBO operating performance, their full exit, possibly associated with performance 
deterioration, should result in an absence of monitoring. The analysis thus includes an empirical 
examination of RLBO operating performance around the year of the sponsors’ full exit. Table 11 
reports such performance adjusted by benchmarks and compares the operating performance one 
year before the exit with that one year after.   
[INSERT Table 11 Here] 
The operating performance measures like ROA and EBITDA/sales exhibit a weak pattern 
of deterioration following buyout sponsors’ full post-IPO exit from RLBOs, and the evidence of 
performance drop is also fairly weak since the mean difference is either marginally significant or 
insignificant. This weakness may result from a selection issue: buyout sponsors are more likely 
to exit quickly if their ownership is less concentrated. This weak evidence does suggest, 
however, that the presence of buyout sponsors helps to improve operating efficiency. 
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VI. Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive sample of RLBOs between 1980 and 2006, this analysis 
examines the IPO timing of buyout sponsors in listing LBOs publicly and the impact of such IPO 
timing on firm performance and exit strategy post IPO. In contrast to earlier findings (e.g., 
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993)), the results indicate that RLBO companies experience no 
significant deterioration in operating performance in post-IPO years. One explanation may be 
that their earlier study uses a small sample of RLBOs in the 1980s. Correspondingly, the findings 
of this present study suggest that performance timing and declines in performance are common 
in the quick flips that were typical in the early sample period.  
I find evidence that buyout sponsor’s LBO restructuring duration is affected by IPO 
timing: when facing favorable IPO conditions or high industry valuations, buyout sponsors tend 
to shorten the time to restructuring LBOs privately. As a consequence of such IPO timing, 
RLBOs with shorter duration experience more deterioration in operating performance following 
their IPOs. Most particularly, buyout sponsors (quickly) flip LBOs to time both operating 
performance and market conditions. Hence, compared to other RLBOs, quick flips experience 
worse operating performance and greater probability of bankruptcy post IPO. However, RLBOs 
as a whole do not exhibit greater declines in operating performance or poorer stock performance 
than comparable firms. This evidence also provides empirical support for Pastor, Taylor and 
Veronesi (2008) in that new listed firms with low profitability volatility and uncertainty such as 
RLBOs show no declines in profitability. 
IPO timing drives RLBO decision but does not affect sponsor’s exit post-IPO, while 
Lockup provisions and concern for reputation help align buyout sponsor incentives to public 
investors. I find that sponsors sell few IPO shares and maintain a significant long-run post-IPO 
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presence and that they make decisions about their post-IPO presence based on company 
fundamentals and market conditions. Across RLBOs, sponsors choose to maintain a longer 
presence in firms with higher cash flows and are more likely to exit RLBOs via facilitating 
takeover when their ownership is greater but via share distribution when the RLBO valuation is 
higher. Nonetheless, more reputable buyout sponsors are more likely to facilitate takeovers.  
Overall, the combined provide empirical support for “pseudo market timing” proposed by 
Schultz (2003) as well as “optimal IPO timing” suggested by Pastor and Veronesi (2005), that is, 
buyout sponsors take advantage of favorable IPO market conditions for new LBO listings but not 
to sell overpriced equity. Buyout sponsor’s IPO timing has important value implications for 
investors: listing immature LBOs destroys value and lead to financial distress, while sponsor’s 
reputation partially mitigates this problem. Moreover, buyout sponsor’s IPO timing does not 
necessarily lead to quick cash out, since in general they retain an active long-run presence post 
IPO and play important monitoring role.   
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Table 1: Industry Distribution of RLBOs 
Using the first 2 digits of the SIC codes and based on IPO data from the SDC new issues file, 
this table reports the industry distribution of the 594 RLBOs in the sample (1981 to 2006). This 
sample excludes RLBOs and other IPOs with an offer size below $5 million, a price below $5.00 
per share, unit offers, closed-end funds, and ADRs, as well as IPOs not listed on the CRSP 
within six months of issuance.  
 RLBOs Other IPOs 
 Frequency Frequency 
Manufacturing 44.16% 33.63% 
Personal/business service 13.76% 21.98% 
Retail 11.68% 5.46% 
Healthcare 3.52% 3.02% 
Restaurant/hotel 3.52% 2.47% 
Radio/TV/telecom 3.04% 2.97% 
Transportation 3.04% 2.78% 
Wholesale 3.04% 3.39% 
Natural resource 2.88% 2.81% 
Insurance 2.24% 3.44% 
Construction 1.44% 1.30% 
Telecommunications 1.28% 1.01% 
Other industry 6.40% 15.74% 
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Table 2: Distribution of RLBOs According to Sponsor 
This table reports the distribution of the 594 RLBOs (1981–2006) in the full sample arranged by 
their 20 most active sponsors, together with the number of deals backed by each leading buyout 
sponsor, average first-day return, gross proceeds, and money left on the table. IPO data, such as 
first-day return, offer size, and offer price, were obtained from the SDC new issues file. The 
sample excludes IPOs with an offer size below $5 million, a price below $5.00 per share, unit 
offers, closed-end funds, and ADRs, as well as IPOs not listed on the CRSP within six months of 
issuance.  
 Deal number 
Average gross 
proceeds 
(in millions USD) 
Money left on the 
table (in millions 
USD) 
KKR 24 213.96 15.51 
Warburg Pincus 17 112.45 9.59 
GTCR Golder Rauner 16 140.49 11.50 
Morgan Stanley Private Equity 16 179.64 17.01 
Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe 16 114.87 10.94 
Bain Capital 14 199.54 7.68 
Thomas H. Lee Partners 12 233.32 30.28 
Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst 11 284.12 22.56 
Kelso & Company 11 128.92 6.45 
Citicorp Venture Capital 10 111.08 9.52 
Texas Pacific Group 10 224.74 79.09 
Apollo Group 9 223.91 14.14 
Blackstone Group 9 402.17 14.93 
DLJ Merchant Banking Partners 9 115.44 25.39 
Forstmann Little & Co. 9 253.94 25.15 
Leonard Green & Partners 9 148.44 6.62 
Madison Dearborn Partners 9 144.81 34.40 
Merrill Lynch 9 69.03 4.67 
Goldman Sachs 8 178.33 127.44 
Lehman Brothers 8 120.66 23.41 
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Table 3: Descriptive Summary of RLBOs 
This table reports the year-number distribution of 594 RLBOs in the sample (1981–2006), the 
LBO duration (years between LBO and RLBO), RLBO total market capitalization (first day or 
earliest available after IPO) for each year, number of quick flips, and total number of post-IPO 
delisting and mergers. Data on price, delisting, and merger were obtained from the CRSP. 
Year RLBOs LBO duration 
RLBOs’ total 
market cap 
(millions USD ) 
Quick flips 
Post-IPO 
delisting 
(nonmerger) 
Post-IPO 
mergers 
1981 1 3.83 280.72 0 0 0 
1982 0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 
1983 2 5.17 1097.44 0 1 3 
1984 3 2.83 150.78 0 1 2 
1985 7 2.04 324.65 2 1 4 
1986 14 3.17 1588.53 2 1 8 
1987 22 1.96 4873.18 7 2 14 
1988 4 1.33 402.50 0 0 2 
1989 3 6.19 672.57 0 1 1 
1990 9 4.07 1595.88 0 8 5 
1991 33 3.90 9440.54 1 6 13 
1992 63 3.74 19086.25 2 8 32 
1993 45 3.76 13792.68 5 5 24 
1994 25 5.14 7440.84 1 2 11 
1995 25 4.47 6787.93 3 6 12 
1996 37 5.13 9920.52 3 7 12 
1997 38 3.36 17212.91 10 4 14 
1998 25 1.39 20652.57 8 2 9 
1999 36 3.38 27562.33 3 3 8 
2000 31 3.17 35356.69 6 1 7 
2001 28 3.10 22406.83 2 0 4 
2002 25 6.74 16122.71 0 0 6 
2003 15 2.54 12238.37 2 0 4 
2004 38 3.76 16884.25 4 1 1 
2005 38 3.94 24846.82 6 0 3 
2006 27 5.44 26423.05 3 0 0 
Total 594 3.75 270738.5 70 61 199 
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Table 4: RLBO Firm Characteristics, Leverage, and Performance  
This table lists the key characteristics (mainly financial leverage) and operating/financial 
performance of the 594 RLBOs in the sample (1981 to 2006) and reports cross-sectional sample 
means for the years IPO-1, IPO, IPO+1, and IPO+2. The performance measures include ROA, 
EBITDA/sales, sales growth, and EBIT/sales. The leverage measures include total debt/asset, 
debt equity ratio, interest coverage (defined as EBITDA/interest expense), subordinated 
debt/long-term debt, convertible debt and preferred stock/long-term debt, debt maturing in two 
and four years/long-term debt, and the percentage of credit rating as investment grade. Panel B 
reports the industry benchmark-adjusted performance for RLBOs in the full sample and for quick 
flips in the subsample. Panel C reports RLBO performance adjusted by the industry and 
performance benchmark (at year IPO-1), and Panel D reports stock performance for both the full 
sample and the quick flip subsample. The mean and median significance were tested using t-
statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
level, respectively. 
Panel A: RLBO Characteristics 
 IPO-1 IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 
Assets ($ million) 799.69 835.82 904.66 968.32 
Employees (million) 4.21 4.75 5.29 6.00 
Market to book ratio, Q -- 2.27 2.05 1.82 
Sales growth rate (%) 28.21 54.89 27.57 18.12 
ROA (net income/asset) (%) 0.33 2.63 3.58 1.51 
EBITDA/sales (%) 13.20 16.25 15.72 12.79 
CAPEX/sales (%) 19.87 17.91 13.95 11.34 
Total debt/assets (%) 56.55 35.82 33.48 33.14 
Debt equity ratio 4.72 2.66 2.42 1.58 
Interest coverage 5.31 6.27 11.96 12.13 
Subordinated debt/long-term debt (%) 27.38 19.15 16.87 14.98 
Convertible debt and preferred stock/long-term debt (%) 91.91 46.85 2.21 3.93 
Debt maturing in 2 years/long-term debt (%) 14.06 16.25 15.73 15.03 
Debt maturing in 4 years/long-term debt (%) 11.96 10.51 15.69 13.96 
Credit rating (percentage of investment grade) (%) 7.06 8.77 11.28 14.73 
Observations 481 496 436 374 
 
Panel B: Industry Benchmark-Adjusted Operating Performance (based on first 3 SIC digits) 
 IPO-1 IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 
Full sample:   ROA (net income/asset) (%)     -mean  -3.48*** -0.60 1.52** -0.43 
                                                                          -median  -2.58*** 1.23 1.57* 0.98 
                        EBITDA/sales (%)                   -mean -1.89**   4.27*** 3.42*** 3.67*** 
                                                                          -median  -3.42*** 2.73** 2.98** 3.35*** 
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Quick flips:    ROA (net income/asset) (%)     -mean -2.69** -1.07* -0.38 -3.80* 
                                                                          -median -1.76* -0.53 -0.96 -2.54** 
                        EBITDA/sales (%)                   -mean    -7.27***   2.39** 0.97 -0.34 
                                                                          -median   -5.58*** 1.23 1.09 -1.82* 
 
 
Panel C: Industry (first 2 SIC digits) and Performance (matching EBITDA/sales at year IPO-1) Benchmark-
Adjusted Operating Performance 
 IPO-1 IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 
Full sample:   ROA (net income/asset) (%)     -mean 0.09  2.13*** 4.19*** 3.68*** 
                                                                          -median 0.14 1.77** 2.23** 2.59*** 
                        EBITDA/sales (%)                    -mean 0.38  5.28***  4.87*** 5.13*** 
                                                                          -median 0.29  6.21***  5.85*** 5.52*** 
Quick flips:    ROA (net income/asset) (%)    -mean 0.13 1.65 0.84 -2.31** 
                                                                          -median 0.11 0.92 -0.26 -1.97* 
                        EBITDA/sales (%)                   -mean 0.25 2.58** 1.72* 0.91 
                                                                          -median 0.27 1.86 1.35 0.96 
 
Panel D: Stock Performance (buy-and-hold return) 
 12 months after IPO 
24 months 
after IPO 
36 months 
after IPO 
Full sample: Raw monthly stock return (%)    -mean 20.10*** 33.73*** 43.35*** 
                                                                          -median 13.06*** 18.75*** 17.32*** 
          Market-adjusted monthly stock return   -mean              9.54*** 11.35*** 13.73** 
                                                                          -median 3.25* -5.58 -11.63 
Quick flips: Raw monthly stock return (%)     -mean 18.70*** 25.08*** 32.03*** 
                                                                          -median -1.64 14.29 16.65 
          Market-adjusted monthly stock return   -mean 6.77 6.82 4.88 
                                                                          -median -9.89 -12.15 -14.52* 
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Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of Post-IPO RLBO Performance 
 This table reports the results of the OLS regressions on the performance of the 594 RLBOs 
between 1981 and 2006. The regression is specified as follows: 
Performance = α0 + α1 LBO Duration + α2 Reputation + α3 Controls + ε.    
Columns 2 and 3 report the change in EBITDA/sales from IPO to IPO+2; Columns 4 and 5 list 
the buy-and-hold stock return adjusted by the value-weighted market benchmark. The 
independent variables include LBO duration, quick flip dummy, debt ratio (total debt/asset), 
logarithm of firm assets, industry change in EBITDA, sponsor capital raised, and average IPO 
underpricing/aggregate number of new IPOs in the previous three months. The regressions also 
control the year fixed effects. The cross-sectional heteroscedastically robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively.    
 ΔEBITDA/sales from IPO to IPO+2  
ΔEBITDA/sales from 
IPO to IPO+2  
36 months market- 
adjusted buy-and-
hold return after IPO  
36 months market -
adjusted buy-and-
hold return after IPO  
 1 2 3 4 
Constant  0.056 (0.19) 
0.071 
(0.28) 
-0.061 
(0.15) 
-0.206 
(0.28) 
Log(LBO duration) 0.032* (1.80)  
-0.004 
(0.31)  
Quick flip dummy -0.023 (0.91) 
-0.037* 
(1.98)  
-0.144 
(0.69) 
Total debt/assets  -0.081** (2.52) 
-0.094** 
(2.21) 
-0.144 
(0.61) 
-0.171 
(0.72) 
Log(assets) -0.003 (0.37) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
-0.173* 
(1.86) 
-0.215* 
(1.85) 
Change in industry  
EBITDA/sales  
0.238 
(1.47) 
0.307 
(1.19) 
0.009 
(0.24) 
0.011 
(0.09) 
Log(buyout sponsor 
capital)  
0.002 
(0.20) 
0.004 
(0.59) 
0.147* 
(1.79) 
0.148* 
(1.73) 
IPO market average 
underpricing in previous 3 
months  
-0.325** 
(2.21)  
-0.521** 
(2.09)  
Log(IPO numbers in 
previous 3 months)  
-0.042 
(0.77)  
-0.063 
(0.38) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.15 
Number of observations 290 290 290 290 
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Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of LBO Duration   
This table gives the results for the OLS regressions of buyout sponsors’ LBO duration for the 
594 RLBOs (1981–2006). The OLS regressions are specified as follows:  
Log(LBO duration) = α0 + α1 Market Conditions + α2 Reputation+ α3 Controls + ε.  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of LBO duration (years of being private between LBO 
and RLBO). The explanatory variables to proxy market conditions include average IPO 
underpricing in the past three months, logarithm of the total number of IPOs in the previous three 
months, and industry Tobin’s Q; the explanatory variables to proxy PE group reputation include 
logarithm of buyout sponsor capital raised and/or vintage age. The control variables are 
logarithm of sales, debt ratio (total debt/assets), EBITDA/sales, and Tobin’s Q, all measured at 
the year of IPO. The cross-sectional heteroscedastically robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.023 (0.78) 
-0.31 
(0.95) 
-0.28 
(0.86)) 
-0.47 
(1.12) 
-0.51 
(1.33) 
Log(sales) 0.073** (2.40) 
0.075*** 
(2.73) 
0.077** 
(2.43) 
0.068** 
(2.26) 
0.075** 
(2.43) 
Total debt/assets 0.092 (0.77) 
-0.053 
(0.49) 
-0.029 
(0.23) 
-0.038 
(0.32) 
-0.031 
(0.25) 
EBITDA/sales 0.880*** (2.69) 
0.877*** 
(2.68) 
0.688* 
(1.98) 
0.734** 
(2.06) 
0.687* 
(1.87) 
Tobin’s Q -0.023 (0.63) 
-0.023 
(0.92) 
-0.024 
(0.94) 
-0.025 
(0.97) 
-0.023 
(0.92) 
IPO market average 
underpricing in 
previous 3 months  
-0.296*** 
(2.75) 
-0.307** 
(2.53) 
-0.401** 
(2.27) 
-0.419** 
(2.64) 
-0.403** 
(2.46) 
Log(IPO numbers in 
previous 3 months)  
0.024 
(0.49) 
0.028 
(0.53) 
0.033 
(0.64) 
0.028 
(0.51) 
Log(buyout firm 
capital)   
-0.021 
(0.59)  
-0.019 
(0.75) 
Log(buyout firm 
vintage age)    
-0.026 
(0.56) 
-0.007 
(0.34) 
Industry Q     -0.053* (1.98) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LBO year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Number of 
observations 343 343 290 290 290 
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Table 7: Decision on Quick Flips and Its Effect on Performance 
This table presents the results of the regressions of long-run performance on quick flip using 
Heckman’s selection approach. Estimations are based on the following: 
First step: Probit (Quick Flip) = α0 + α1 · Control Variables + ε 
Second step:  Performance = α0 + α1 Quick Flip + α2 Control Variables + α3 Lambda + ε. 
Column 2 gives the first-step probit regression results for quick flips; Columns 3, 4, and 5 
present the second-step OLS regression. The OLS regression in Column 3 uses EBITDA/sales; 
the probit regression in Column 4 uses a delisting dummy, and the OLS regression in Column 5 
uses the buy-and-hold return. EBITDA/sales are calculated as the average of the years IPO, 
IPO+1, and IPO+2, measured at the end of the year and adjusted by industry median. The 
delisting dummy is set to 1 if a firm is delisted from the market within a three-year window post-
IPO. The buy-and-hold return is measured three years following IPO and adjusted by the value-
weighted market benchmark. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the first-step 
selection regression. The heteroscedastically robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses; *, **, 
and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 1
ST Step 
Selection  
Second-Step 
Regression 
 Quick Flips Industry adjusted EBITDA/Sales 
Delisting  
Dummy 
36 months Buy-
and-hold Return 
after IPO 
Constant   0.041 (1.19) 
0.137 
(0.98) 
-0.179 
(0.49) 
Quick flip dummy  -0.056* (1.87) 
0.467* 
(1.72) 
-0.072 
(1.45) 
Dummy for IPO debt reduction   0.023 (0.620) 
0.192 
(0.81) 
0.033 
(0.28) 
Log(underwriter rank)  0.047 (1.07) 
0.266 
(0.20) 
-0.011 
(0.23) 
IPO underpricing  -0.063*** (3.22) 
0.185 
(0.64) 
-0.465* 
(1.69) 
Buyout sponsor ownership before 
IPO  
-0.021 
(0.49) 
-0.081 
(0.17) 
-0.735** 
(2.21) 
Log(sales) at IPO year  -0.012 (0.35) 
-0.032* 
(1.69) 
-0.090* 
(1.78) 
Firm assets before IPO/buyout 
sponsor size 
-0.221* 
(1.61)    
Log(buyout sponsor capital)  -0.003 (0.97)    
EBITDA/sales prior to IPO 0.072* (1.73)    
Log(assets prior to IPO) -0.004 (0.92)    
Log(total IPO numbers in previous 
3 months) 
0.162* 
(1.55)    
 39
IPO market average underpricing in 
previous 3 months  
0.518 
(0.98)    
Lambda  -0.625*** (4.38) 
-0.611 
(0.38) 
-0.352 
(0.96) 
R2 0.06 0.18 0.23 0.08 
Number of observations 272 272 272 272 
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Table 8: Ownership Structure of RLBOs and Sponsors’ Post-IPO Presence 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 594 RLBO firms (1981–2006) on 
the following characteristics: percentage of shares sold by buyout firm at IPO, buyout firm 
ownership before and after IPO, insider (management and directors) ownership before and after 
IPO, LBO holding years (years after LBO and before RLBO), buyout firm capital (total capital 
raised from the firm’s inception to the year before RLBO), and buyout firm vintage age (the 
difference in years between the firm’s founding and the RLBO). Panel B reports the ownership 
and board share of sponsors for a subsample of RLBOs between 1995, when SEC filings of 
proxy statements became available, and 2005. 
Panel A: Whole Sample  
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
Percentage of shares sold at IPO by 
buyout sponsors  6.35 0.00 18.23 -31.04 100 
Buyout ownership before IPO 60.19 60.05 24.79 9.14 100 
Insider ownership before IPO 54.18 59.60 35.41 0.00 100 
Insider ownership immedaitely after IPO 34.68 37.85 26.55 0.00 96.6 
LBO years (between LBO and RLBO) 3.75 2.83 2.82 0.25 17.5 
Buyout firm capital ($ MIL) 4408.12 1794 6937.66 2.8 38990 
Buyout firm vintage years 16.22 15 9.28 0.00 58 
Panel B: Subsample from 1995–2005 
Buyout group ownership 
IPO year 39.77 39.65 20.10 1.70 84.08 
IPO +1 year 32.36 30.82 20.94 0.00 79.80 
IPO +2 year 26.91 23.40 21.57 0.00 77.10 
IPO +3 year 23.95 21.05 21.81 0.00 76.20 
Board share of leading buyout group (%) 
IPO year 38.35 37.50 19.07 0.00 88.90 
IPO +1 year 32.05 30.00 17.31 0.00 87.50 
IPO +2 year 28.14 25.00 16.67 0.00 77.78 
IPO +3 year 25.26 25.00 15.74 0.00 70.00 
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Table 9: Duration of Sponsor’s Post-IPO Exits  
This table shows the regression results for buyout sponsor duration post-IPO (from RLBO to 
final exit). The Cox proportional duration regression is specified as follows: 
 h(t|x) = h(t)* exp(α1 · x1 + α2 · x2 +…+ αN · xN)            x = x1,  x2,  …, xN.,
The dependent variable is the survival variable measuring duration of sponsor’s presence post-
IPO up to their full exit. The independent variables include EBITDA/sales (industry adjusted), 
logarithm of asset, debt ratio (debt/asset), Tobin’s Q, stock performance (excess monthly stock 
return over value-weighted market), total number and average underpricing of all IPOs in the 
past three months, industry Q, market return (S&P 500 index), and buyout sponsor reputation 
(capital raised/vintage age). The heteroscedastically robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 1 2 3 
Industry-adjusted EBITDA/sales -3.378*** (2.73) 
-3.662*** 
(2.96) 
-3.661*** 
(2.89) 
Log(assets) -0.006 (0.16) 
-0.009 
(0.38) 
-0.008 
(0.23) 
Total debt/assets -0.229 (0.34) 
-0.292 
(0.44) 
-0.276 
(0.42) 
Tobin’s Q 0.126*** (6.22) 
0.122*** 
(5.13) 
0.117*** 
(3.68) 
Excess stock monthly return over 
market 
-0.901** 
(2.27) 
-0.105** 
(2.23) 
-0.101** 
(2.00) 
Log(IPO numbers in previous 3 
months) 
0.382 
(0.82)   
Average underpricing in previous 
3 months  
0.024 
(0.44)  
Industry Q   0.058** (2.38) 
Market return (S&P 500)   0.237 (1.24) 
Log(buyout firm capital) 0.019 (0.39)  
0.021 
(0.86) 
Log(1+buyout firm vintage age)  0.003 (0.61) 
0.002 
(0.53) 
Log likelihood -1254.81 -1347.21 -1429.24 
P -value, joint test  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of observations 736 736 736 
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Table 10: Determination of Sponsor’s Post-IPO Exit Choices  
This table gives the results for the regressions of buyout sponsors’ full exit decisions on cash 
flow and other firm characteristics for the 594 RLBOs (1981–2006). The probit regressions are 
specified as follows:   
Exit Dummy =α0 + α1 · Cash Flow + α2 · Control Variables + ε. 
In Columns 2 and 3, the dependent dummy equals 1 if the sponsors exited via takeover post-IPO, 
0 otherwise; in Columns 4 and 5, it equals 1 if they exited via gradual distribution, 0 otherwise. 
In Columns 6 and 7, the analysis uses a multinomial probit regression in which the dependent 
dummy equals 1 if the exit was via takeover, 2 if via gradual distribution, and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables include LBO duration, EBITDA/sales, Tobin’s Q, debt ratio, sales, 
industry Q, and buyout reputation (capital raised/vintage age). The control variables include 
logarithm of assets and total-term debt/assets. The heteroscedasticaly robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively.  
 Probit Probit Multinomial probit 
 
Y=1 if exit 
via takeover 
0 otherwise 
Y=1 if exit 
via gradual distribution, 
0 otherwise 
Y= 1 if exit via takeover 
2  if gradual sale 
0 otherwise 
Constant  -2.658 (0.89) 
-1.232 
(1.92) 
-0.952 
(0.91) 
-0.505 
(0.73) 
-1.349 
(2.38) 
-2.928 
(2.07) 
Log(LBO holding years) -0.444* (1.62) 
-0.167 
(1.01) 
0.776* 
(1.58) 
0.832 
(1.54) 
-0.412* 
(2.11) 
0.905 
(1.37) 
EBITDA/sales at IPO year -0.713* (1.64) 
-1.448** 
(2.23) 
-0.707 
(0.40) 
-0.709 
(0.42) 
-0.103* 
(1.84) 
-0.880 
(0.62) 
Tobin’s Q at IPO year -0.142 (1.33) 
-0.029 
(1.03) 
0.104* 
(1.69) 
0.162* 
(1.80) 
-0.020 
(0.26) 
0.131* 
(1.67) 
Debt/assets at IPO year 0.303 (0.72) 
0. 347 
(1.02) 
-1.412 
(1.07) 
-1.552 
(0.98) 
0.214 
(0.50) 
-1.587 
(1.13) 
Log(sales) at IPO year 0.061 (0.80) 
0.072 
(1.16) 
-0.195 
(0.45) 
-0.204 
(0.65) 
0.212** 
(2.44) 
-0.235 
(0.45) 
Industry Q  -0.033 (0.64)  
0.257** 
(2.09) 
-0.017 
(0.35) 
0.306* 
(1.99) 
Log(buyout firm capital) 0.256*** (4.35) 
0.190*** 
(3.38) 
-0.062 
(1.35) 
-0.108 
(1.25) 
0.394*** 
(4.37) 
0.006 
(0.26) 
Buyout sponsor ownership 
after IPO  
1.212** 
(2.50)  
-0.376** 
(2.38)   
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.16   
Number of observations 272 198 272 198 272 
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Table 11: Operating Performance Change around Sponsors’ Full Exit  
This table reports the summary statistics for RLBO operating performance around the year of the 
sponsors’ final exit post IPO. Of the 594 RLBOs between 1981 and 2006, 64 had sponsors that 
have fully exited. The cross-sectional mean and median of the operating performance are 
reported for the following years: one year prior to exit, the year of exit, and one year following 
exit. The performance measures, ROA and EBITDA/sales, are adjusted by industry benchmarks 
in Panel A, and by industry and performance benchmarks (matching performance at two years 
before exit) in Panel B. The mean and median significance were tested using t-statistics and 
Wilcoxon z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Industry (first 3 SIC digits) Benchmark 
 
 1 year before exit (64 RLBOs) 
Year of exit  
(64 RLBOs) 
1 year after exit 
(64 RLBOs) 
P-value, difference 
between -1 and +1 of exit 
year 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ROA (net 
income/assets) 
(%) 
2.22** 1.75* 2.09* 1.38 1.67 0.87 0.16 0.22 
EBITDA/sales 
(%) 6.19*** 5.83*** 5.77** 5.04*** 4.28** 4.19*** 0.23 0.38 
Panel B: Industry (first 2 SIC digits) and Performance (matching EBITDA/sales at IPO-1 year) Benchmark  
 
 1 Year before exit (64 RLBOs) 
Year of exit  
(64 RLBOs) 
1 Year after exit 
(64 RLBOs) 
P-value, difference 
between -1 and +1 of exit 
year 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ROA (net 
income/assets) 
(%) 
3.49*** 2.24** 2.97*** 2.08** 2.11** 1.43 0.10 0.13 
EBITDA/sales 
(%) 5.41*** 3.95*** 4.82*** 3.60*** 3.21** 2.69** 0.09 0.11 
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Figure 1: Operating Performance of Quick Flips and other RLBOs around IPOs   
Using the median value of EBITDA/sales for the years IPO-1, IPO, IPO+1, and IPO+2, this 
figure shows the operating performance of all RLBOs in the sample (1981–2006), including the 
70 quick flips and the other RLBO companies. Annual accounting data are taken from 
COMPUSTAT. 
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